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Abstract
This study examines how countries develop and
benefit from Digital Government (DG). The literature
proposes various conceptualizations of the valueadding logic of DG, but the benchmarking practice is
not responding to such proposals. For instance, the
United Nations’ E-Government Survey combines the
readiness and uptake indicators and fails to cover any
impact indicators; thus, its diagnostic value is limited.
To overcome this limitation, we introduce a new
assessment scheme based on the DG value chain
concept and pursue the question: how do the world
countries add value in this chain? Reassembling the
UN’s e-Government Survey indicators and the World
Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators, we examine
how the 191 UN Member States converted their
readiness into uptake and uptake into impact over the
2014-2018 period. The results rank the countries
concerning their performance along the DG value
chain, identify hotspots, and calculate the value chain
performance of regional and economic groups.

1. Introduction
An infamous psychometric bon mot, inspired by
[1], suggests that intelligence is what the tests of
intelligence measure. Regardless of how accurate this
statement is, a person scoring high in the IQ tests is
usually considered intelligent. Can the quality of
countries’ Digital Government (DG) be assessed in the
same way? Do high DG benchmark scores indicate
high DG quality? Some state that DG is an umbrella
concept, which means “many different things to
different people according to one’s focus” [2, p. 186].
Thus measuring DG is about subscribing to a particular
framework and adopting its success criteria, not unlike
a tacit acceptance of an IQ test.
However, we think that the point lies elsewhere.
The literature puts DG at the center of a process aiming
to create public value [3], including numerous value
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chain models, e.g., [4]. In their simplest generic form,
such models identify the stages of readiness, uptake,
and impact, although the terminology used could vary.
The issue is whether sufficient value is added via
transitions between consecutive stages of a country’s
DG value chain. Further investigation of this issue
leads to diagnostic questions whether this country
succeeds in building and using its DG given its state of
readiness, whether the usage of DG brings actual
benefits to the country, and a practical issue of how to
calculate answers to both questions.
The UN E-Government Survey is arguably the
most recognizable, global, and long-lasting Survey
dedicated to assessing country-level DG. The Survey
supplies two indices – E-Government Development
Index (EGDI) and E-Participation Index (EPI), which
triggered numerous academic studies and political
debates. Adding to these debates, we note that both
indices skip the logic of value addition through the DG
value chain: EGDI combines the readiness and uptake
indicators, and both indices fail to consider any impact
indicators. Thus we must agree with the following
observation: “little attention has been given to the way
in which the effects of Digital Government policies or
initiatives can create public value to solve societal
problems” [5, p. 29]. Even worse – the results may be
misinterpreted or misused. According to [6, p. 171], “it
is always necessary to be aware of the risks of their
[benchmarks’] politicization. Decision-makers can be
influenced by perceptions, so it is important to ensure
that those perceptions are correct”. From a diagnostic
perspective, the Survey leaves two key questions
unanswered. Is DG uptake commensurable with DG
readiness? Does it generate enough DG impact?
To address such questions, we constructed a new
assessment model to capture the DG value chain’s
logic. For simplicity, the model consists of three stages
– readiness (R), uptake (U), and impact (I); and two
transitions (activities) – readiness-to-uptake (R2U) and
uptake-to-impact (U2I). Seeking a balance between
capturing a country’s DG value chain (relevance) and
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data availability to capture this chain (feasibility), we
realized that existing benchmarks, while not delivering
sufficient diagnostic value on their own, could still
provide data for the new model. With this in mind, we
decided to represent the readiness stage by two EGDI
components – Telecommunication Infrastructure Index
(TII) and Human Capital Index (HCI), and the uptake
stage by the third EGDI component – Online Service
Index (OSI), together with EPI. We also decided to
represent the impact stage, which is missing from the
UN Survey, by three components of the World Bank’s
Worldwide Governance Indicators [7]: Government
Effectiveness (GE), Voice and Accountability (VA),
and Control of Corruption (CC). Technically, multiple
indices at each stage were joined into a single synthetic
value R, U, and I, employing the standard statistical
technique of Principle Component Analysis.
The primary diagnostic outcome of this approach is
the values of the R2U and U2I indicators, calculated by
subtracting the values of U and R and the values of I
and U, respectively. Concerning the years of capture,
assuming a period between stages and in line with the
UN and World Bank’s surveys’ availability, we took
the value of R at 2014, U at 2016, and I at 2018. The
population consists of 191 UN member states.
Analyzing this data permitted ranking countries
concerning their performance along the DG value
chain, identifying hotspots, and calculating average
performances of the regional and economic groupings.
The approach proposed in this study may open up
new diagnostic possibilities for DG evaluation and
benchmarking. They include: quantifying countries’
progress along their DG value chain, verifying the
evidence of digital performance against government
propaganda claims, and supporting the analysis of the
mechanisms behind global digital transformation. The
results may help identify cases of countries and groups
that merit closer examination concerning their progress
along the DG value chain, including causes of their
under-performance or over-performance. They could
also help verify the reliability and informational value
of existing instruments. The target audience includes
policy-makers, public managers, analysts, researchers.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows.
Section 2 carries out a literature review to serve as a
background for this study. Section 3 presents the main
research problem, along with the DG value chain
assessment framework, as well as the data and methods
used to address this problem. Section 4 applies this
framework to the collected data and describes the
findings. Section 5 carries out a discussion on the
process and findings. Section 6 summarizes the main
findings, outlines the limitations of this research, and
provides future research directions.

2. Background
This section carries out a literature review to build
the background for this study. We discuss the process
logic (Section 2.1), three perspectives on DG as an
outcome of a process (Section 2.2), as a process itself
(Section 2.3) and as a value chain (Section 2.4), and
the measurement of the DG value chain in general
(Section 2.5) and with the UN Survey (Section 2.6).

2.1. Process logic
Defining a process as “a series of actions to achieve
a result” or “a series of changes that happen naturally”
[8] puts DG in the context of a process right at its
definition. Considering a compilation of existing DG
definitions [9], it can be easily noticed that besides the
Information and Communication Technology (ICT)
component, most definitions follow the general logic
of ICT-driven transformation. The expressions such as
“to benefit citizens”, “to enable and improve
efficiency” or “in the transformation of government”
[9, p. 8] indicate that we expect changes to happen
through some action. A similar observation applies to
other compilations of this type, e.g. [10, p. 972].
It should be noted that the literature introduces
several DG-related terms that follow the process
orientation. First, the term “e-governance” refers to the
use of ICT “to enhance the governance process and
support e-Democracy, e-Government, and e-Business”
[11, p. 385] or represents a “grid of governmental and
technological relations” for “a political plan, a vision,
or an institutional glue” [12, p. 39]. This term is also
explored in [13] to conclude that “each author or
scholar has to set out his or her definition first and
proceed from there” [13, p. 8]. Another term is
“transformational government” [14][15], understood as
“reengineering and e-enabling back-office processes
and information systems to facilitate more joined-up
and citizen-centric e-government services” [15, p. 1].
While the terminology used is rich, we subsequently
confine to the term Digital Government (DG).
How can DG be adapted to the process logic? Two
variants stand out in reply: whether DG is considered
an outcome of a process or a process itself.

2.2. DG as an outcome
The first variant is principally about DG that
evolves. At the start of this evolution is readiness,
generally understood as the government’s capacity and
willingness to adopt ICT solutions [16]. The construct
constituted the foundation of EGDI and remained its
focus until 2008 [17], with changes in readiness
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illustrating the process of DG development. Readiness
is a subject of criticism from theoretical and practical
(assessment-oriented) standpoints [16][18].
Deeper understanding involves stage-based models,
designed to “better understand the current situation of
digital government in terms of results” [19, p. 408].
The focus is on the technical, functional, and political
growth, referring to DG as a whole or its components,
such as Internet portals. The process can lead from
“cultivation” to “revolution”, from (Web) “presence”
to “political participation”, from “online presence” to
“digital democracy”, etc. [20].
This process can also be labeled “evolution”, as in
[21], which draws a four-stage path from “digitization”
as the primary technology stage to “contextualization”
as the advanced policy stage. The terms used by the
authors are somewhat confusing, e.g., transformation is
one of the stages in the evolution model [21]. Other
authors, e.g., [5, p. 18] apply this term to denote
change, modernization, and innovation. Yet, others
speak of growth or development [22].
Regardless of the terminology used, the models
above describe the process of DG development and
use. Whether this process satisfies the first definition –
a series of actions to achieve a result, or the second – a
series of spontaneous changes, is a philosophical issue:
to what extent the transformation can be designed,
scheduled, and executed, and whether technological
disruption can take control over this transformation.

2.3. DG as a process
The second variant is closer to the idea of this
study. Here, the DG itself is like a business process, a
collection of activities that produce specific outputs
[23, p. 366]. Within this setting, one can ask: what are
the activities, and what are the outputs?
While DG should be developed and used as part of
a process, this DG uptake is neither the starting point
nor the output in itself. In line with the readiness
construct, DG uptake requires favorable conditions on
the ground – social, economic, technical, political.
Concerning outputs, they logically entail the impact
that DG is intended to create. We can then speak of at
least two activities: turning DG conditions into DG
uptake and turning DG uptake into DG impact.
Management studies offer various templates for
such models. Besides a business process, the most
generic one is a logic model, i.e., “a roadmap or
simplified picture that displays connections between
resources, activities, and outcomes”, in its simplest
form just linking inputs, outputs, and outcomes [24].
Here DG uptake would refer to a logic model’s output,
and its external effects would be labeled as outcomes.

Another example is the value chain [25], which can
be “a powerful tool in diagnosing and explaining how
the management of competitive advantage takes place
within the firm” [26, p. 3]. In its original business
context, the concept is built around such constructs as
value (price), primary activities (e.g., logistics), and
supporting activities (e.g., procurement) [25][26]. The
universal feature of the value chain is value
enhancement: “The activities that a firm performs
become part of the value added produced from a raw
material to its ultimate consumption” [26, p. 1].
What should be taken as a value to enhance? The
choice may be easy for businesses but less evident for
DG. Generically, it can be public value, though this
construct is “so fundamental as to be unmanageable”
[27, p. 355]. The arguments for such a choice follow
“Public value creation has become the expectation that
digital government initiatives have to fulfill” [3, p. 1]
or “Public value is intended to be the equivalent for the
public sector of private value” [4, p. 277]. The concept
of DG as a public value booster has taken a steady
position within the research domain [28]. In the sequel,
we elaborate on the logic of this enhancement.

2.4. DG as a value chain
The literature offers several DG-related value chain
models, though different motivations and inconsistent
terminologies make the landscape far from coherent.
Heeks proposes a comprehensive conceptualization
of the DG value chain, organized into precursors,
strategy, inputs, development, intermediates, adoption,
use, outputs, impacts, and outcomes [4]. They form the
“higher-order stages” of readiness, availability, uptake,
and impact, also indicated in [29]. This model can be
compared to an early elaboration [30], which proposes
a more business-oriented chain. Heeks is also engaged
in the construction of the ICT for Development
(ICT4D) project framework [31], based on the value
chain structurally similar to the one discussed above,
although with outcomes preceding impacts [31, p. 3].
A slightly simpler variant is proposed in [32], treating
hope as the primary input and incentive.
Although not labeled as a value chain explicitly, an
interesting model is introduced in [33]. The model
captures the transformation logic, from transformation
reasons, objects, and processes, to outputs, outcomes,
and impacts. Value creation is among the identified
impacts in this model [33, p. 9].
Despite all terminological and conceptual diversity,
for simplicity, we now associate this kind of general
process logic with a DG value chain.
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2.5. Measuring DG value chain
Most of the models above provide a comprehensive
explanation of the value creation through DG, but to
transfer them to the realm of practical measurement,
assessment, and benchmarking is still an open problem.
In that sense, theory overtakes practice.
While [4] provides an extensive set of suggestions
on how to refer to the structure of the chain in the
design of new benchmarks, it also indicates challenges:
“benchmarking tends to focus on the core of the value
chain – intermediates, adoption, and use – rather than
the main upstream (precursors, inputs) or downstream
(impacts, outcomes, to some degree outputs) elements”
and benchmarking is limited in “understanding the
value of e-Government” [4, p. 267].
A similar problem is identified in [5]: “suitable
evaluation indicators for the assessment of the success
of Digital Government policies and initiatives are
lacking” and “little attention has been given to the way
in which the effects of Digital Government policies or
initiatives can create public value to solve societal
problems” [5, p. 29]. Deducting from [29], while early
stages of the value chain are relatively well-covered by
the global or country-level benchmarks, local and
transient benchmarks mostly dominate later stages.
A different reflection can be found in [6]. Although
the author supplies a list of potential elements to be
measured, corresponding to the chain logic, e.g.,
inputs, outputs, effectiveness, and impacts, he also
states that “Benchmarks should … be targeted to
answer specific and narrow questions” [6, p. 171].
Even if there were widely available benchmarks
that precisely capture each stage performance, they
would say little on their own about the state of the
chain as a logical sequence of value-creating steps.
Given this, some studies confront digital assessment
with external measures, examining how DG affects,
e.g., corruption [34] or effectiveness [35], or how DG
quality is predetermined by the type of political regime
[36]. However, such efforts are oriented towards
exploring the characteristics of DG itself without
focusing on the performance of individual countries.
Some studies also apply a more holistic approach,
such as: balancing a country’s DG performance with
its expected governance impact [37] – one of few
globally scoped studies; monitoring the whole DG
system in Belgium [38]; or monitoring and measuring
“the public value of ICT interventions” in Italy [39].

2.6. Measuring DG value chain with EGDI
Designing and implementing a comprehensive DG
benchmark is a massive technical and organizational
endeavor. Thus, when speaking of globally-scoped

country-level DG benchmarks, academics and analysts
are left with few instruments [40, p. 387][41, pp. 4–5].
Among them, EGDI and EPI supplied within the UN’s
E-Government Survey [17] cover the broadest scope in
terms of geographic coverage (193 countries in 2018)
and regularity (biennial editions from 2003 to 2020).
However, these most recognizable indices are also
intensively criticized [42, p. 68]; a compilation of the
critique would fill a paper by itself. For this study, we
should note that the technical construction of the index
[17, pp. 199–200] leads to a mixture of measures that
refer to different stages of the DG value chain.
Mukamurenzi et al. notice that “EGDI mixes egovernment development with general development in
a way that on the one hand is reasonable as both
technical infrastructure and literacy are prerequisites
for use of e-government services, on the other hand,
makes it difficult to discern the e-government
component in development” [43, p. 127], while
according to [44, p. 69], “since HCI is a component of
EGDI, this component may artificially make EGDI to
have higher value than the reality”.
The problems with EGDI can also be explained
through the theory of measurement, which offers two
basic measurement models [45, p. 103]. In the
reflective model, individual indicators reflect an
underlying construct, e.g., the DG value chain. In the
formative model, the construct’s meaning is
determined by selecting particular indicators [45].
EGDI is based on the formative model. Even the
Survey’s designers are not exactly convinced what this
composite measure is meant to illustrate [17] –
readiness, maturity, development? The framework also
remains technically much the same from the beginning,
even though its authors declare updating it “to reflect
new trends in e-government” [17, p. xx].
Consequently, the relevance of the conclusions
built solely upon the results of the existing benchmarks
is moot. Numerous studies suggest keeping distance
from these values, which do not guarantee reliable
diagnostic insights, even if nominally correct. For
example, there are significant dissonances between DG
scores and the quality of real governance [37]: “any
country, no matter how undemocratic, can score high
on eParticipation” [46, p. 32]; or “autocracies do not
perform worse in later UN editions” [36, p. 276].
Reliable DG evaluation is key to countries that
devote public funds to developing and promoting their
DG and its use. According to [5, p. 29], “measuring
and evaluating effects of digital government initiatives
… is of great strategic importance for any public sector
organization”. Referring to the value chain to carry out
reflective measurement of the DG process may help
separate useful insights from politically-inspired or
technologically-driven information noise.
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3. Methodology
This section presents a research approach adopted
to address the central research problem: how do the
world countries add value through the DG value chain?
To answer this question, we had to consider existing
theoretical models for value creation and the scarcity
of international instruments to measure such value
creation. Hence, we designed a custom conceptual
model to balance what is and what should be.
In the rest of this section, we present the DG value
chain’s conceptual model in Section 3.1, gathering and
processing data to populate this model in Sections 3.2
and 3.3 respectively, the validity of the model in
Section 3.4, and research questions in Section 3.5.

3.1. Conceptual model
Before constructing the model, we adopted some
conceptual and technical assumptions. First, to focus
on the value changes along the DG value chain rather
than on the values produced at different stages of the
chain. Second, as value creation takes time, to examine
value changes within a period. Third, to base the model
on the UN Survey as the most recognizable and steady
DG benchmarking project. Fourth, to relate DG’s
impact with improvements in public governance,
arguably associated with many benefits of DG.
Due to the level of abstraction and the complexity
of interactions, quantifying and measuring the value
chain is nontrivial. Certain propositions emerge
[47][48], often tied to a sectoral context. Also, there is
no single model for the DG value chain. While a path
from readiness to impact is repetitive, different terms
and explanations emerge at implementation. Given the
central position of DG development and use (uptake)
and the assumption that there should be at least one
stage preceding and one following DG uptake, we
propose a simplified model as a compromise between
the logic of the DG value creation and the offer of
global benchmarks. Its stages are described in Table 1.
Table 1. Stages of the DG value chain model [4]
Stage
Readiness (R)
Uptake (U)
Impact (I)

Description
Fundamental preconditions of DG,
associated with precursors or inputs
Mechanisms and use of DG, corresponding
to intermediates or outputs
Governance benefits supported by DG,
corresponding to impacts and outcomes

Most DG value chain conceptualizations only refer
to the concept of stages, e.g., development is one of the
stages in [4, p. 269]. However, as commented earlier,
capturing a country’s state of DG in concrete stages

without referring to the state of DG in other stages says
nothing about the value created by DG. The latter is
about relationships between stages. The clue of our
approach is to examine the transitions in the DG value
chain, not the stages of this chain. In other words, to
estimate the scale of value addition, we focus on the
differences between stages. To this end, we define two
transitions between consecutive stages, as in Table 2:
R2U between and R and U and U2I between U and I.
Table 2. Transitions in the DG value chain model
Transition
R2U
U2I

Description
Turning DG readiness into DG uptake
Turning DG uptake into DG impact

3.2. Data
To calculate the values of the R and U stages in the
DG value chain of a country, we use the UN Survey’s
constituent indicators. To calculate R, we apply the
Telecommunication Infrastructure Index (TII) and the
Human Capital Index (HCI) that represent the
country’s digital infrastructure and human capacity. To
calculate U, we use the Online Service Index (OSI)
that represents online public services and the eParticipation Index (EPI) that describes interactions
between government and citizens in this country [17].
As the I stage is not captured by any of the UN
Survey’s indicators, we refer to three World Bank’s
Worldwide Governance Indicators instead [7] –
Government Effectiveness, Voice and Accountability,
and Control of Corruption. We associate them with
those aspects of governance that are expected to
benefit from digitalization, regarding both the
normative standpoints, e.g. [9], and the major trends in
the analytical studies, e.g. [34][35][49].
As the literature does not define how much time a
single value addition takes, we took the span between
two consecutive editions of the UN Survey – two years
– as our time unit. Thus the latest R data comes from
2014, U from 2016, and I from 2018. The objects
under examination were all UN member states
represented in the Survey. However, we eliminated
Monaco and San Marino, for which some values of the
WGI indicators were missing, retaining 191 countries.
To consider the DG value chain performance of
groups of countries, not only individual ones, and thus
capture possible macro-trends, we included some data
external to the DG value chain. Such data includes
REGION – geographical context and the countries’
regional assignments [50], and INCOME – economic
context and the countries’ income group assignment
[51]. For further comparison, we also reached to the
original values of EGDI. All three variables were taken
in the middle year – 2016. The variables are in Table 3.
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Table 3. Original indicators used in the research
Stage Measure
Human Capital Index (HCI)
R
Telecom Infrastructure Index (TII)
Online Service Index (OSI)
U
E-Participation Index (EPI)
Government Effectiveness (GE)
I
Voice and Accountability (VA)
Control of Corruption (CC)
Region (REGION)
Income group (INCOME)
E-Gov. Development Index (EGDI)

Scale

Source

0 to 1

[52]

0 to 1

[52]

z-score (0,1)

[53]

17 regions
4 levels
0 to 1

[50]
[51]
[52]

3.3. Data processing
Data processing involves replacing constituent
indicators like, e.g., HCI and TII with the single one –
R representing a stage in the DG value chain. As a
stage is a well-defined construct within a chain, we
expected high correlations between the indicators at
each stage. As the model is reflective, we also hope
that a different but still relevant to the central concept
set of indicators would also support the underlying
constructs and reveal relatively high correlations.
To calculate three synthetic indicators for R, U,
and I, each quantifying different stages of the chain in
a year, we applied the Principal Component Analysis
(PCA) method. PCA reduces “the dimensionality of a
data set … while retaining as much as possible of the
variation present in the data set” [54, p. 1]. See the
factor approach to EGDI in [42]. We determined the
number of components to retain using eigenvalue
greater than 1 (Kaiser rule) and at least 80% variance
explained [54, pp. 111–149].
We name the resulting indicators, which capture the
values of the DG value chain’s respective stages and
transitions: iR, iU, iI, iR2U, and iU2I. In order to
preserve comparability in terms of the central tendency
and variance, the z-score standardization procedure
was applied. So, iR, iU, and iI are the standardized first
components of R, U, and I. The indicators of R2U and
U2I – iR2U and iU2I – are the standardized differences
between iU and iR, and between iI and iU.
Due to the descriptive character of value addition,
lacking one established quantification method, we
associate value addition with value change between
two consecutive stages. As standardized indicators
represent these values, they refer to a country’s relative
position on a scale rather than an external determinant
of quality. Given the standardized forms of iR2U and
iU2I, if one of them exceeds 1, we say that the DG
value chain produces an R2U (U2I) surplus. If one of
them is less than -1, then it produces R2U (U2I)
deficit. Otherwise, the DG value chain is normal. The
combination of surplus, deficit, and normal values of
R2U and U2I summarizes the state of the chain.

3.4. Model validity
The validity relies on the logical interpretation of
the literature and two verifying questions.

First, do aggregated data support the constructs
behind R, U, and I? The high positive correlations
between the original indicators in the respective stages
and the positive results of the PCA method application
(“in a reflective view, the first principal component is
the best solution” [45, p. 106]) at each stage permit us
to answer this question affirmatively.
Second, does the order of stages allow us to expect
a causal path? Heeks notices that “the causal path from
e-Government to outcomes is too indistinct”, but also
suggests that “it may be worth undertaking some
exploratory correlations to see if any patterns emerge”
[4, p. 272]. Our model is simplified, thus not meant to
explain the values at one stage by those at previous
stages. Nonetheless, the high positive correlations
between the values of R and U (0.76) and U and I
(0.65) support the concept of a logical pattern.

3.5. Research questions
We can finally decompose the general research
problem into three questions: 1) Which countries are
the best and worst in iR2U and iU2I? 2) What are the
average values of iR2U and iU2I in the geographic and
economic groupings? 3) How do the values of iR2U
and iU2I correspond to the values of EGDI?

4. Findings
Table 4 depicts basic descriptive statistics for the
input dataset. Some elements are worth noticing:
moderate skewness of HCI (negative), and TI and CC
(positive); the platykurtic character of the distributions,
especially for OSI and EPI; and GE, VA, and CC not
revealing averages equal to 0 and standard deviation to
1, because they are a subset of the original dataset.
Table 4. Original dataset – descriptive statistics
HCI
TI
OSI
EPI
GE
VA
CC

Mean
0.65
0.36
0.46
0.47
-0.08
-0.04
-0.08

Med.
0.71
0.31
0.46
0.49
-0.21
0.04
-0.25

St. dev.
0.20
0.25
0.27
0.27
0.99
1.00
0.99

Skew.
-0.74
0.52
0.10
0.05
0.24
-0.21
0.61

Kurt.
-0.09
-0.82
-1.10
-1.07
-0.39
-0.95
-0.31

Using the standard “boxplot” technique [55], we
identified just one outlier in the entire dataset – South
Sudan with 0.00 HCI in 2014. Considering its marginal
impact on further calculations, we retained this case.
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In line with our assumptions, within a single stage,
all pairs are strongly and positively correlated. For R,
the correlation coefficient between HCI and TI is 0.80;
for U, the correlation between OSI and EPI is 0.97; for
I, the correlation between GE and VA is 0.71, between
GE and CC, is 0.91, and between VA and CC is 0.78.
Table 5 presents standard deviations and share of
variance for the first components, computed for each
stage. In line with our assumptions, each component
has an eigenvalue (the square of standard deviation)
bigger than one and explains over 80% of the original
variance. Thus, they provide a good summary of the
original data. For R and U, both component loadings
are 0.71. For I, they are: GE 0.58, VA 0.55, CC 0.60.
Table 5. First Principal Components for the stages
Stage
R
U
I

Standard deviation
1.34
1.40
1.61

Share of variance
0.90
0.99
0.87

Here are the top and bottom countries considering
the values of iR, iU, and iI. Countries with the highest
value of iR are South Korea (1.95), Australia (1.84),
and Iceland (1.75), with the lowest are Somalia (-2.42),
Niger (-2.09), and Burkina Faso (-1.90). Countries with
the highest value of iU are the United Kingdom (1.99),
Australia (1.91), and South Korea (1.82), with the
lowest, the Central African Republic (-1.72), Djibouti
(-1.69), and Tuvalu (-1.69). Countries with the highest
values of iI are Finland (2.18), Norway (2.14), and
Switzerland (2.13), with the lowest are South Sudan
(-2.15), Somalia (-2.03), and Yemen (-1.96).
Table 6 lists five the most and five the least
successful countries in turning DG readiness into DG
uptake. The most successful are India (2.92), Ethiopia
(2.63), and Morocco (2.43). The least successful are
Antigua and Barbuda (-2.68), Palau (-2.66), and Libya
(-2.30). Remarkably, half of the ten least successful
countries are Small Island Developing States (SIDS).
Table 6. iR2U – 5 top and bottom countries
Top 5
Country
India
Ethiopia
Morocco
Bangladesh
Tanzania

iR2U
2.92
2.63
2.43
2.41
2.24

Bottom 5
Country
Antigua and Barbuda
Palau
Libya
Saint Kitts and Nevis
Tuvalu

iR2U
-2.68
-2.66
-2.30
-2.12
-2.05

Table 7 lists five the most and five the least
successful countries in turning DG uptake into DG
impact. The most successful are Tuvalu (2.28),
Micronesia (2.06), and Palau (2.06); the least are
Uzbekistan (-2.27), Mexico (-2.14), and Russia (-1.97).

Remarkably, four out of the five most successful
countries in turning DG uptake into DG impact are
SIDS. An interesting pattern emerges here: successful
governance with little contribution from DG. On the
other side, a group of countries like Morocco, Mexico,
and China, which all successfully turned DG readiness
into uptake, cannot turn DG uptake into impact.
Table 7. iU2I – 5 top and bottom countries
Top 5
Country
Tuvalu
Micronesia
Palau
Switzerland
Andorra

iU2I
2.28
2.06
2.06
1.99
1.88

Bottom 5
Country
Uzbekistan
Mexico
Russia
Bahrain
Azerbaijan

iU2I
-2.27
-2.14
-1.97
-1.91
-1.89

The overall state of the DG value chain comprises:
101 countries produce normal iR2U and iU2I, 17
produce normal iR2U and deficit iU2I, 16 produce
normal iR2U and surplus iU2I, 16 produce deficit
iR2U and normal iU2I, 14 produce deficit iR2U and
surplus iU2I, 12 produce surplus iR2U and normal
iU2I, and 15 produce surplus iR2U and deficit iU2I.
Statistical construction impacts this distribution.
It is also worth listing the countries where the
advantage of iR2U over iU2I (left part of Table 8) or of
iU2I over iR2U (right part of Table 8) is exceptionally
high. Countries like Morocco or Mexico successfully
developed DG but failed in creating good governance.
On the other side, SIDS like Palau or Antigua achieve
good governance despite low DG uptake.
Table 8. Highest differences between iR2U and iU2I
Country
Morocco
Mexico
India
Bangladesh
Ethiopia

iR2U-iU2I
4.22
4.11
3.93
3.85
3.70

Country
iU2I-iR2U
Palau
4.71
Antigua and Barbuda
4.43
Tuvalu
4.33
Saint Kitts and Nevis
3.85
Barbados
3.54

Turning to the regional analysis, Table 9 presents
the most and the least successful regions in turning DG
readiness into DG uptake using the average values of
iR2U for those regions. Southern Asia is the most, and
Micronesia and Polynesia are the least successful
regions in that respect.
Table 9. iR2U (average) – 5 top and 5 bottom subregions
Top 5
Region
Southern Asia
Sub-Saharan Africa
Northern America
South-eastern Asia
Western Asia

iR2U
1.02
0.35
0.34
0.17
0.17

Bottom 5
Region
Micronesia
Polynesia
Central Asia
Western Europe
Northern Europe

iR2U
-1.35
-1.23
-0.52
-0.47
-0.44
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Table 10 captures regional success in turning DG
uptake into DG impact. The most successful regions
are Micronesia, Polynesia, and Melanesia; the least
successful are Central, Western, and Eastern Asia.
Table 10. iU2I (average) – top and bottom 5 subregions
Top 5
Region
Micronesia
Polynesia
Melanesia
Western Europe
Northern Europe

iU2I
1.85
1.54
0.98
0.84
0.57

Bottom 5
Region
Central Asia
Western Asia
Eastern Asia
Northern Africa
Eastern Europe

iU2I
-1.06
-0.82
-0.80
-0.70
-0.50

Concerning the economic analysis, Table 11
depicts the average values of iR2U and iU2I for four
income groups. For iR2U, the lower the income, the
higher iR2U. As high-income countries have high Rvalue already, this is unsurprising. For iU2I, the lowincome group turns DG uptake into DG impact better
than the lower-middle- or upper-middle-income group
but worse than the high-income group.
Table 11. iR2U and iU2I (average) for income groups
Income group
High
Upper-middle
Lower-middle
Low

iR2U
-0.39
-0.32
0.37
0.63

iU2I
0.32
-0.11
-0.20
-0.03

Finally, consider the relationship with EGDI. The
correlation between EGDI (2016) and iR2U or iU2I is
negligible – Pearson coefficients are 0.06 and -0.16,
respectively. Thus, EGDI says little about the DG
value chain. Given the thresholds in the UN survey
(0.25, 0.5, 0.75), Table 12 depicts the average values of
iR2U and iU2I for the four groups. Note that lowEGDI countries turn their low DG readiness into good
DG uptake and further into DG impact, while highEGDI countries fail to turn DG uptake into DG impact.
The middle-EGDI group is better in turning DG uptake
into impact than in turning DG readiness into uptake.
Table 12. iR2U and iU2I (average) for EGDI groups
EGDI group
Very High
High
Middle
Low

iR2U
-0.09
0.07
-0.16
0.28

iU2I
0.15
-0.43
0.23
0.29

5. Discussion
The highlight of our approach to assessing value
addition through DG is to examine differences between
stages in the DG value chain. While the chain is

variably described in the literature, we managed to
utilize the existing benchmarks and propose a simple
measurement model that follows the logical path from
DG readiness to DG uptake to DG impact. Our model
offers a viable path to a comprehensive and
diagnostically useful scheme of DG assessment.
The research results reveal several facts that are
hidden from traditional indicators. First, the patterns of
DG value addition strongly vary. A group of countries
like China, Mexico, or Morocco can turn DG readiness
into DG uptake and fail to turn DG uptake into DG
impact. A group of countries, including Palau, Antigua,
or Barbuda, fail to build DG uptake, despite DG
readiness but succeed in producing DG impact.
Second, the findings highlight diversity in the DG
value chains within regional and economic groups.
Third, the results confirm doubts about the diagnostic
value of the EGDI Survey. Effectively, EDGI is mute
on whether DG is developed optimally or contributes
to improvements in public governance.
As part of this study, we learned that evaluating
countries’ DG performance through the value-based
approach provides useful insights into how DG works.
Existing data is imperfect, but additional indicators and
intelligent rearrangement may reveal problems raised
in literature as peculiarities of the existing benchmarks.
This work may be beneficial to various groups of
DG stakeholders. Researchers may refer to the DG
value chain model as an alternative way of analyzing
and explaining digital transformation mechanisms.
Benchmark designers could find ideas on different
ways of building their instruments. Policy-makers
could learn whether and why certain countries manage
to benefit from DG while others fail to do so and find
analogies and useful lessons for their own countries.

6. Conclusions
In this study, we examined the countries’ DG
performance from a different perspective than existing
benchmarks. Instead of capturing the state of selected
DG mechanisms, we captured how DG creates value
holistically. To this end, we referred to the concept of
the value chain and redesigned the existing schema of
DG measurement to reflect the logic of this chain. The
results revealed the most and the least successful
countries in realizing the DG value chain, produced
insights about the performance of such chains within
geographic and economic groups, and compared such
performance with the UN Survey findings.
This research has some limitations. The first is the
simplified nature of the DG value chain in our model,
which balances theory-based conceptualizations and
what existing benchmarking instruments have to offer.
The second is quantifying DG stages and transitions
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relative to the countries’ positions, not relative to
external DG guidelines. Third, as the results refer to a
particular period – 2014, 2016, and 2018 – they do not
convey a sustained tendency. Fourth, while we
examined the DG value chain performance against a
list of factors, this list is not exhaustive.
In the future, we plan to develop this model into a
more comprehensive and reusable framework. We also
plan to explore the literature and harness additional
statistical techniques to build a useful toolset to help
design and analyze DG value chains.
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